Armed Servants

Agency, Oversight, And Civil-Military Relations

by Peter D. Feaver
language: english
Publisher: Harvard University Press, March of 2005 ‧
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How do civilians control the military? In his book, Feaver proposes a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state.

Armed Servants

Agency, Oversight, And Civil-Military Relations

by Peter D. Feaver

Property Description
ISBN: 9780674017610
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Release Date: March of 2005
Language: English
Dimensions: 144 x 227 x 23 mm
Cover: Softcover
Pages: 400
Format: Book
Categories: Books in English > Politics > Politics in General
Books in English > Others
EAN: 9780674017610